The Atomic Bombs- Were they necessary?

Was the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki solely to bring World War II to an end?

Since the 1960s the controversial decision to use atomic bombs upon Japan has been debated. Traditionalists such as R.Frank and R.Newman claimed that the bombs ended the war and saved thousands of American lives single-handedly. Revisionists like G.Alperovitz claimed that there were other factors that contributed to Japan’s surrender, diminishing the A-bombs importance and bringing the necessity of the bombs into question. The debate continues to this day, with an extreme polarisation of traditionalist versus revisionist opinion. It will be shown that the A-bombs were the sole factor in bringing Japan’s surrender, that other factors put forward by revisionists were not influential in Japanese government. A key concept to understand first is the Japanese devotion to the emperor.

The idea that Japanese people and, more importantly, Japanese leaders, were devoted to the imperial family is key to arguing that the atomic bombs were the sole reason for Japan’s surrender. Surrender was not going to be a possibility given the devotion to the emperor and to the war. The US was facing an enemy of which only one organised unit would surrender in the entirety of the war^[2]_, willing to die to preserve the imperial family. The historian R. Newman points out that the emperor had to direct the Japanese ministers twice to accept the Potsdam Declaration (unconditional surrender). Even then there was an attempted coup by prominent officials to destroy the surrender broadcast^[5]. Newman argues this was telling of the attitudes prevailing throughout the war, that typical Japanese persons were of no psychological disposition allowing for surrender on conventional grounds. Newman is not a psychologist, but a historian, and it could be argued he could not make such a judgement as a result. However, corroborating evidence from historian R.Frank strengthens this view, stressing army leaders were the dominant force in government and that (based on diplomatic intercepts), until the two A-bombs, they were still confident they could force “heavy losses in [Ketsu-Go]”83, a plan to inflict heavy US invasion losses, attaining better surrender terms as a result. Both Frank and Newman wrote in the wake of the Smithsonian Controversy, 1993-1995, where an exhibit of the Enola Gay aircraft (delivered one of the A-bombs) reignited debate. Organisations, including the US Air Force and veteran soldiers, argued that the exhibit had a revisionist slant on events, that the atomic bombs were being downplayed⁹⁰. Both historians thus seem to be writing within the context of a defensive action on the traditionalist viewpoint. This doesn’t make these historians unreliable, but suggests they should be used with some caution as evidence. They both wrote perhaps specifically with the goal of defending the mainstream (traditionalist) viewpoint of contemporary society, and could be argued to be operating within the constraints of popular (social and political) acceptance. Criticism may also lie in Newman’s backround. Newman fought in WWII as a US soldier. From the Smithsonian Controversy we know that veterans of the war hold the position typically that the atomic bomb saved their lives as the war ended only days after both bombs were dropped. It could be argued that Newman came to his interpretation of events with a passive subjectivity moving him towards supporting the bombs. However, as an author of several other historical books, including the topical “The Enola Gay and the Court of History”, demonstrating a solid backround in the history of the topic, suggests he is likely to have balanced his views without bias from his US nationality or career.  In any case this devotion to war of Japanese military diehards would mean it would be the A-bombs alone which would persuade them of the need to surrender.

Revisionists claim that Japanese high-level government officials were effectively pressing for peace, and thus the A-bombs were not the sole factor in the surrender. G.Alperovitz argues Japanese officials consistently made surrender offers in the lead up to the bombs, and thus the atomic bombs were limited in importance to surrender. He points to diplomatic intercepts the Americans received, “Foreign Minister Shigemitsu has instructed Ambassador Sato to find out whether Russia is willing to assist in bring about a negotiated peace”^[6]. This is genuine evidence of peace attempts but its credibility is weakened because it does not represent the view of the entire Japanese government, these men were politicians and not the military ‘diehards’ who held meaningful power in government. Thus the view that these were serious attempts can be challenged. Alperovitz uses the post-war United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) report extensively to support the idea that the Japanese were “Seeking… some way to surrender”^[8] and that this reflected the general will of the Japanese government. What he fails to note is that the USSBS report was highly selective and limited in scope. The authors interrogated only two high-level officials, neither were fanatical army leaders. R.Newman argues the report was subjective in form of rivalry between Airforce and Navy interrogators, “the army airforce wanted to hear…conventional bombing brought about surrender, navy officers that surrender was caused by the sea blockade and naval aviation”⁹¹. R.Frank strengthens this view, arguing that the reports were compiled “in the midst of conflicts over service roles and budgets”⁹². Thus Alperovitz’s dependence on USSBS reports weakens his own reliability. In fact the Japanese were nowhere near officially offering surrender. The peace party in Japan did not have the strength^[9] to overcome hardcore army ministers like Admiral Toyoda and General Anami, of the ‘Big Six’ (the Cabinet). R.Frank states “The big six never agreed on terms”^[10]. This seems particularly true when analysing diplomatic intercepts. Soviet Ambassador Sato, in a reply to Foreign Minister Togo said “If the Japanese nation is really faced with the necessity of terminating the war, we must first of all make up our minds to terminate the war”^[11]. This significantly strengthens Frank’s argument. The government was still dominated by diehard military leaders, who wanted continuance of the war, ensuring the preservation of the Emperor (which US unconditional surrender terms did not guarantee). The cabinet were divided between the army and peace advocates (like Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido). They were in no position to seriously offer surrender. Even those favouring peace wanted, as historian M.Hastings put it, “Unacceptable terms,” including preservation of the emperor, retaining Manchuria, and the right to prosecute their own war criminals^[12]. This differed greatly from the unconditional surrender formula outlined, and demanded by the US public. Hastings, one of the most recent writers (2007) on the atomic bombs, makes use of the most newly available evidence. Material was declassified in 2005, including intercepts pertinent to the diplomatic situation in Japan, suggesting the government were in no position to surrender56_, which strengthens his interpretation over earlier writers like Alperovitz(1995). This new material drew Hastings towards the conclusion that peace negotiations were to fail. Furthermore, Hastings is a member of the revisionist movement, the fact that he accepts peace negotiations were doomed to failure lends considerable weight to the traditionalist side of the debate. As a result we can conclude that political peace moves were never to succeed, that only the A-bombs could persuade military diehard leaders to submit.

A further factor argued to have played a role in Japan’s surrender is the threat of US invasion on the Japanese homeland. The revisionist J.R.Skates points to the fact that whilst the Japanese had a large military presence in Kyushu, most of the troops were “green”^[23] (inexperienced), thus an invasion was viable. Skates writes with the intention of arguing that the invasion of Japan would have been successful. This narrows the scope of his argument, as it discusses solely physical military obstacles, discounting key factors, like the inability of political leaders to make peace whilst power lay with military figureheads, thus his usefulness is weakened. Alperovitz points to the fall of Okinawa, April 1945. This led to the collapse of the Koiso government, replaced with Premiere Suzuki. Alperovitz argues that the government would have been susceptible to another Okinawa-equivalent shock through invasion, tipping the balance of power into the peace party’s hands (particularly in light of the more open-minded premiere)²⁴. This is not real evidence to support the argument that Japan was approaching surrender before the atomic bombs. Revisionists do not consider that the Japanese were aware they would ultimately lose the battle for Kyushu. Japan’s military leaders had planned a rapid, decisive battle lasting 2-3 weeks^[26], suggesting that the Japanese were looking for an opportunity to gain better surrender terms than unconditional surrender (not victory). They would do this by inflicting unacceptable losses on US forces. The idea of this battle undermines Skates and Alperovitz’s argument, Japan would not surrender whilst they [the government] still believed conditional surrender was attainable. As M.Hastings said, “the A-bomb…rendered invasion redundant.”^[33] If anything, the threat of an invasion on Japanese homelands made surrender less likely. It only served to stiffen military diehard resolve in a decisive battle which they irrationally believed would achieve better peace terms for Japan.

Another factor revisionists argue had an influence in Japan’s surrender was the policy of blockade and bombardment. Some people believed Japan could be resource-starved into submission, and therefore the A-bombs impact upon surrender is somewhat diminished. By targeting merchant shipping and railway networks many military figures, including Admiral King, believed Japan could be choked for resources, to the point where surrender was unavoidable63. J.Skates argues the policy was destroying Japan’s ability to fight. He points to a Joint Intelligence Staff report claiming the policy would render the Japanese navy “impotent” and “virtually neutralize” the airforce, reducing army combat ability to “only a few months”^[34].  Skates’ book is specifically arguing that an American Invasion was a viable alternative to the bombs, and his history as a Colonel in the US Army might suggest his book favours the army positively, placing doubt on integrity. Alperovitz follows the same lines, pointing towards another Joint Intelligence Staff report concluding “Japan is even more dependant than Great Britain upon imports from overseas”^[35].  This is a credible judgement, Japan’s merchant navy was almost completely destroyed^[36]. Alperovitz and Skates make a poor choice in sources, however. Skates uses General Arnold to suggest Japan would surrender after being “pummelled” with “1,651,000 tonnes”^[37] of bombs. Alperovitz uses Commander E.J.King to argue “the dilemma [Operation Olympic] was unnecessary…the effective naval blockade would…have starved the Japanese into surrender”^[38]. Skates states Arnold at the time wanted to separate the air force from the army, and thus had an interest in claiming the air force led to Japan’s capitulation⁹³. Skates goes on to point out that King, a naval supporter, believed General MacArthur was trying to win the war by himself through an invasion, intentionally cutting the navy out of the loop⁹⁴. Both men had reasons to cooperate, the Navy wanted a larger role in Japan’s defeat than the army, and the air force wanted independence from the army. This suggests both sources may be subjective, and damages their credibility as a result.

Traditionalists argue blockade and bombardment had little effect upon the Japanese, and thus the A-bombs maintained sole credit for Japan’s surrender. Hastings argues that “Armadas of Allied bombers had been…killing civilians in hundreds of thousands over three years”^[39] without bringing surrender, and this would not change. Most traditionalists accept the policy of blockade and bombardment would have brought about eventual surrender, but the policy has to be set in context. R.Frank acknowledges that the policy would have placed severe strain on Japan, pointing to Tokyo which imported 97% of its rice^[40]. However, he argues the policy would take years^[41] to force surrender, likely, given the levels of indoctrination within Japan. The fact that Frank balances his views, yet still comes to this conclusion adds weight to his argument. R.Newman goes further, arguing Japan had sufficient reserves to allow the continuation of war well into the future, pointing to a Joint Target Group report which suggested Japan had reserves to match total ammunition production under “favourable conditions in one year”^[42]. Newman’s argument is complimented by an investigation from T.R.H.Haven who suggested that the contemporary Japanese average diet of 1793 calories per day was sufficient^[43]. Haven is an expert resource analyst, awarding considerable weight to Newman’s own argument. Perhaps Skates is right in claiming blockade and bombardment would “break the will of the people”^[44] but this is irrelevant, for it was military diehards who were in control. Conventional bombing and blockade was having little political effect, but would lead to the potential starvation of millions^[45], the atomic bomb on the other hand would kill thousands and bring about surrender in a matter of days, taking sole credit for Japan’s submission.

The final factor possibly involved in forcing surrender was the Russian invasion of Japanese-occupied Manchuria, that the invasion of the previously neutral Russians was such a shock to Japanese leaders that surrender followed swiftly. Alperovitz argues the Russians were a primary concern for Japanese leaders, and were thus behind the ultimate surrender of Japan. He writes specifically to argue that the Russian invasion caused Japan’s surrender, using this to support his strong anti-A-Bomb beliefs. His writing lacks balance in the debate, possibly as a result of his strong opinion on A-bombs, suggesting a level of subjectivity. His argument has some clear flaws. He argues military diehards within the Japanese cabinet were still hopeful of Russian neutrality^[46], and as a result, a Russian invasion would translate into an “extraordinary political-military shock”^[47] for those leaders like General Anami and Admiral Toyoda, forcing them to “realise the inevitability of defeat”. Alperovitz argues that this would give the peace party (being Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido and Prince Konoye) a new advantage with which they could sue for peace. He points to several facts. First, 34 hours after the Hiroshima bomb, Japan still “urgently sought clarification of the Russian position”. This suggests that the Japanese deemed the Russians a larger threat than atomic weaponry, raising the possibility that Japan would have surrendered without the atomic bomb. He strengthens his argument with MAGIC intercepts whereby Foreign Minister Shigemitsu directed Soviet Ambassador Sato to “sound out her[Russia’s] feeling about the continuance of the neutrality pact”^[48] This could be credible evidence, given that orders came from high-level ministerial positions. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was not, however, a military diehard. It is therefore arguably weaker evidence than first appears, since only military leaders had real control over Japan at the time. Without direct evidence from these leaders it is hard to estimate the government’s true feelings regarding Russia. Alperovitz’s second fact is that military leaders claimed to be too busy to meet following the first bomb, only meeting following Russian entry into the war^[49]. This evidence is weak; it could be interpreted either way. Perhaps military leaders were unaffected by the A-bombs, or perhaps it was because they did not know what they had been hit by, investigating the unknown weapon used. It took several days for teams of scientific investigators to fully assess and report the large-scale damage that the bomb incurred which could easily explain their delay in meeting. The traditionalist side of the debate centres around the fact that the Japanese had already accepted Soviet entry into the war was imminent and therefore the “extraordinary political-military shock” was diminished. Historian E.J.Drea argues “the Japanese had no illusions about an eventual Soviet invasion”^[50]. Drea is a recognised expert in Japanese communication intelligence throughout the war, suggesting his conclusions were thoroughly researched. His point is strengthened with evidence from a forecast to European Japanese Attachés by the Vice Chief of the Imperial Navy reading “If the opportunity presented itself, the Soviets would enter the war against Japan in the latter half of 1945”.^[50] This evidence’s credibility is strengthened as it originates from an influential military, not political, leader (unlike Alperovitz’s intercepts). As events turned out, the forecast was correct. Thus it cannot be argued the Russian invasion was the shock factor that brought Japan into submission. The real underlying issue regarding the Russian invasion is that (according to J.Cooper) it fails to invalidate Operation Ketsu-Go^[51]. Army diehards including Anami and Kawabe implemented Martial Law in reaction to the Russian invasion, cementing their dominance in politics^[52]. At the same time Tokyo sent orders to the Kwantung Army based in Manchuria to “conduct a delaying action” which Newman argues centred around the military belief that a “decisive blow on the American invasion” was still the best option.^[53] Clearly the Russian Invasion was not a factor for military diehards. Therefore the Russian invasion was not of such importance in Japan’s surrender as Alperovitz would argue; it would take something that would invalidate Operation Ketsu-Go, the atomic bomb, to persuade the military that the Americans would not invade now that they had such a powerful weapon.

In conclusion, the fanaticism of military diehards rendered peace attempts impossible;  they wanted to continue war. The threat of American invasion only drew Japanese military leaders further away from rational thought with beliefs of a glorious decisive battle. A drawn-out policy of blockade and bombardment was not having any affect on the Japanese Government in the short term, so could not have brought about the rapid surrender the US population demanded. The Russian invasion, was equally unimportant in the eyes of Japan’s leaders, they had already forecast the invasion, had incorporated it into military strategy, and had decided the invasion would not invalidate Operation Ketsu-Go. Therefore it was the atomic bombs that achieved peace. With it the army’s belief that the US would invade evaporated, Operation Ketsu-Go was made redundant. Diehards could no longer hope for better surrender terms. “The Germans began the bombing of civilian centres; the Japanese adapted it…to it the allies responded in kind- as it turned out, with greater effectiveness.”103

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[2] P4 Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, Robert P. Newman, Michigan State University Press 1995

 

90 E. Gallagher ‘The Enola Gay Controversy http://digital.lib.lehigh.edu/trial/enola/’

[5] P109 Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, Robert P. Newman, Michigan State University Press 1995

83 P97 Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, Richard B. Frank, Penguin Books 2001

[6] P23 The Decision to use the atomic bomb”, Gar Alperovitz, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995

[8] P4 The Decision to use the atomic bomb”, Gar Alperovitz, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995

[9] If the Atomic Bomb had not been used www.theatlantic.com/issues/46Dec/compton.htm, Karl Compton

[10] P227 Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, Richard B. Frank, Penguin Books 2001

[11] P225 Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, Richard B. Frank, Penguin Books 2001

[12] P487 Nemesis The Battle for Japan, 1944-45, Max Hastings, Harper Collins Publishers 2007

56 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jul/30/japan.secondworldwar

[23] P72 John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, University of South Carolina Press, First Paper Back Edition, 2000

[26] P177 Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, Richard B. Frank, Penguin Books 2001

[33] P517 Nemesis The Battle for Japan, 1944-45, Max Hastings, Harper Collins Publishers 2007

63 P19 John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, University of South Carolina Press, First Paper Back Edition, 2000

93 P26-28 John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, University of South Carolina Press, First Paper Back Edition, 2000

94 P18-21 John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, University of South Carolina Press, First Paper Back Edition, 2000

[34] P54 John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, University of South Carolina Press, First Paper Back Edition, 2000

[35] P19 The Decision to use the atomic bomb”, Gar Alperovitz, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995

[36] P102 John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, University of South Carolina Press, First Paper Back Edition, 2000

[37] P27 John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, University of South Carolina Press, First Paper Back Edition, 2000

[38] P327 The Decision to use the atomic bomb”, Gar Alperovitz, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995

[39] P489 Nemesis The Battle for Japan, 1944-45, Max Hastings, Harper Collins Publishers 2007

[40] P350 Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, Richard B. Frank, Penguin Books 2001

[41] P34 Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, Richard B. Frank, Penguin Books 2001

[42] P16 Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, Robert P. Newman, Michigan State University Press 1995

[43] P38 Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, Robert P. Newman, Michigan State University Press 1995

[44] P54 John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, University of South Carolina Press, First Paper Back Edition, 2000

[45] P38 Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, Robert P. Newman, Michigan State University Press 1995

[46] P116 The Decision to use the atomic bomb”, Gar Alperovitz, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995

[47] P85 The Decision to use the atomic bomb”, Gar Alperovitz, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995

P114 The Decision to use the atomic bomb”, Gar Alperovitz, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995

[48] P25 The Decision to use the atomic bomb”, Gar Alperovitz, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995

[49] P419 The Decision to use the atomic bomb”, Gar Alperovitz, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995

[50] P99 Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, Robert P. Newman, Michigan State University Press 1995

[51] P3 John W Cooper, The Atomic Bomb, www.johnwcooper.com/papers/atomicbombtruman.htm

[52] P289 Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, Richard B. Frank, Penguin Books 2001

[53] P99 Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, Robert P. Newman, Michigan State University Press 1995

103 Albert Einstein